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INTERNATIONAL LAW-NEW ACTORS AND NEW
TECHNOLOGIES: CENTER STAGE FOR NGOS?*
JOHN KING GAMBLE** AND CHARLOTTE Ku***
I. INTRODUCTION
Anyone whose head is not planted deeply in the sand must recognize
that momentous changes are afoot with this phenomenon called the
information age. Evidence of sweeping change at the mundane, day-to-
day level is undeniable. Five-year-old children manipulate computer
mice with astounding dexterity. Professors find the World Wide Web
has become the principal research tool used by their students to
prepare papers; six years ago neither those students nor their profes-
sors had heard of the web.'
Ronald Deibert argues persuasively that "changes in modes of
communication-the various media by which information is stored
and exchanged-have significant implications for the evolution and
character of society and politics at a world level." ' 2 Will the information
age have a significant effect on international law? International law has
shown itself capable of moving along at its own lethargic pace, often
influenced only marginally by the external world for which it is
* The genesis of this piece is unusual. One of us (Gamble) began to investigate how new
information technologies might affect international law. SeeJohn K Gamble, International Law and
the Information Age, 17 MICH.J. INT'L. L. 747 (1996);John King Gamble, New Information Technologies
and the Sources of International Law: Convergence, Divergence, Obsolescence and/or Transformation, 41
GERMAN Y.B. INT'L. L. 170 (1998). The other author (Ku), as Executive Vice President of the
American Society for International Law, the principal professional organization in the world
having international law as its focus, was forced to confront how to bring an established
association into the information age without sacrificing traditional strengths. SeeCharlotte Ku, The
ASIL as an Epistemic Community, 90 AM. Soc'Y INT'L. L. PROC. 224, 584 (1996); Charlotte Ku, The
American Society of International Law in the Electronic Age: Challenge and Opportunity, 3 HAGUE JOINT
CONF. 142 (1995). We found we were addressing many of the same issues and problems, although
from different vantage points.
** Professor of Political Science and International Law, Pennsylvania State University.
*** Executive Director, American Society of International Law.
1. As part of an information age needs assessment, in 1997, the ASIL conducted a survey of
its 4300 members, 40% of whom reside outside the U.S. The survey showed that 80% of members
use e-mail, but 40% had never used the World Wide Web. The general conclusion was that ASIL
members are not technology adverse, but want to guard their most precious resource, their time.
See Charlotte Ku & John King Gamble, International Law Communications Network: An ASIL Needs
Assessment (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
2. RONALD J. DEIBERT, PARCHMENT, PRINTING AND HYPERMEDIA: COMMUNICATION IN WORLD
ORDER TRANSFORMATION 2 (1997).
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developing norms. Behavior occurs at so many individual and institu-
tional levels that profound change at the human level can be blunted,
distorted, or blocked entirely before its influence is felt on the interna-
tional law-making plane. These reservations notwithstanding, evidence
exists that international law and the systems and assumptions that
undergird it will be transformed by the information age.
Technology and the information age are changing the allocation of
power and authority in the international system with non-state actors
such as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) assuming decision-making roles previously
reserved primarily to states.3 Professor DavidJohnston sees the informa-
tion age as "creating deep and broad disruptive breaches in our society,
disruptions equal to those of the agricultural or industrial revolu-
tions."' 4 Professors Keohane and Nye believe that the information age
will alter the power structure of governments. 5 Jessica Mathews's
stimulating article in Foreign Affairs argues both that the information
revolution is shaking the foundations of state authority, the principal
tenet of international law since 1648, and that the scholarly community
has been slow to understand the profound ramifications of these
changes.
The most powerful engine of change in the relative decline of
states and the rise of non-state actors is the computer and
telecommunications revolution, whose deep political and social
consequences have been almost completely ignored. Widely
accessible and affordable technology has broken governments'
monopoly on the collection and management of large amounts
of information and deprived governments of the deference
they enjoyed because of it. In every sphere of activity, instanta-
neous access to information and the ability to put it to use
multiplies the number of players who matter and reduces the
number who command great authority. The effect on the
loudest voice-which has been the government's-has been
the greatest. 6
Mathews's analysis forces us to re-examine our assumptions about
the allocation of authority and decision-making in international rela-
3. See David Held, Democracy and Globalization, 3 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 251, 261 (1997).
4. DavidJohnston, Challenge of the Highway, MACLEAN'S, Oct. 12, 1998, at 58, 58.
5. See Robert O. Keohane &Joseph S. Nye,Jr., Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,
FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 1998, at 81, 93-94.
6. Jessica T. Mathews, PowerShifl, FOREIGN AFF.,Jan./Feb. 1997, at 50, 51.
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tions and international law. The changes she describes have been
accelerated by the end of the Cold War and the bursting of the bipolar
dam that for fifty years constrained and simplified the international
system. Observations like these challenge the 300-year-old fundamental
operating assumption of the international system that the authority
and structure of states will dwarf all other elements. Reacting to this
new authority structure, ProfessorJames Rosenau recommends moving
beyond governments, which are tied too closely to states, and instead
focusing on the broader concept of governance, which he thinks will be
"transcendent" in the late twentieth century.7
A key element of this challenge to state authority is globalization.
Wolfgang Reinicke describes,"the integration of a cross-national dimen-
sion into the very nature of the organizational structure and strategic
behavior of individual companies." 8 Because these activities are under-
taken to overcome the constraints of national boundaries, they pose a
direct challenge to states that derive their authority by maintaining
territorial boundaries to define the reach of their authority. Reinicke
foresees a "threat to a government's ability to exercise internal sover-
eignty" and perhaps even a threat to democracy itself.9 In response to
this challenge, he proposes a partnership between public and private
entities to formulate a global public policy using "cross-national struc-
tures of public interest" and the creation of "more dynamic and
responsive institutions of governance."'O
In presentations we made at the FourthJoint Conference (American
Society of International Law/ Nederlandse Vereniging voor Interna-
tionaal Recht) held in The Hague in 1997, we argued that the context
within which international law operates has been shaped by two broad
forces: (1) the state-centric character of the post-Westphalian interna-
tional system; and (2) the Gutenberg global information system domi-
nated by the printed word." The former has been analyzed extensively;
7. James N. Rosenau, Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics, in GOVERNANCE WrrHouT
GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD PoLTICs 1, 1 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempie
eds., 1992).
8. Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Global Public Policy, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1997, at 127, 127.
9. Id. at 130.
10. Id. at 137.
11. The panel was entitled "The Effect of New Electronic Technologies on the Sources of
International Law," part of the FourthJoint Conference (American Society of International Law/
Nederlandse Vereniging voor Internationaal Recht) held in The Hague. Participants were
ProfessorJohn King Gamble (Pennsylvania State University); Professor Alfred Soons (University
of Utrecht); Judge Gilbert Guillaume (International Court ofJustice); Professor Donald McRae
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the latter, at least so far as it affects international law, largely has been
ignored.
A. The Role of Information in the International Arena
Professor Ethan Katsch, one of the first scholars to address broad
normative questions about the information age, explained why the
revolution in information would be much more significant than other
technological changes that have influenced the law:
Other new technologies, such as nuclear power or biotechnol-
ogy or medical advances, have caused a reassessment of several
areas of legal doctrine. Yet, information technology is different
and presents the law with a very different challenge. It is
different because.., the law runs on information and because
much of law is information.... Changes in our information
environment are important for all institutions in society. They
may, however, be particularly important for law. Law is not only
a process that touches all other societal institutions but it is, as I
have stressed, an institution that is fundamentally oriented
around information and communication.
12
The pace and complexity of life in the late twentieth century has set
dramatically higher standards for the amount of information needed
for decision-making. When analyzing the twentieth century from the
vantage of the information age that drove its last decade, historians may
see the leitmotif of the development and use of information on the
structures and modes of that information. The NGOs that are our focus
have heightened awareness of the information age they helped to
create in the first place.
The importance of information is hardly limited to recent scholar-
ship in international relations, international institutions, and interna-
tional law; however, the volume of information and variety of subjects
covered have expanded drastically, demanding new modes to deal with
the information. Further, "privatizing" of the sources of information
has significant implications for governance and law-making. Professor
Inis Claude's classic treatment of the development of international
(University of Ottawa); Dr. Charlotte Ku (American Society of International Law); and Professor
Rein Mfillerson (King's College London). SeeJohn King Gamble, New Electronic Technologies and the
Sources of International Law: Convergence, Divergence, Obsolescence and/or Transformation, 4 HAGUE
JoINT CoNr. 314, 315 (1998).
12. M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WoRLD 7, 239-40 (1995).
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organizations noted,
The third major stream of the development in the organization
of international life arose from the creation of public interna-
tional unions-agencies concerned with problems in various
essentially nonpolitical fields. Whereas both the Concert [of
Europe] and the Hague [Peace Conferences] reflected the
significance of the quest for security and the importance of
high political issues, this third phenomenon was a manifesta-
tion of the increasing complexity of the economic, social,
technical, and cultural interconnectedness of the peoples of
the modern world.
13
The growth of international institutions-both IGOs and NGOs-in
the twentieth century is attributable, in part, to the need for informa-
tion necessary for collective action.
In his seminal introduction, Professor HaroldJacobson describes the
major functions of international organizations, the first of which is
informational. The others are normative, rule-creating, rule-supervi-
sory, and operational.
Informational functions involve the gathering, analysis, ex-
change, and dissemination of data and points of view. The
organization may use its staff for these purposes, or it may
merely provide a forum where representatives from constituent
units can do these things.
Normative functions involve the definition and declaration of
standards. This function does not involve instruments that have
legally binding effect, but rather proclamations that are de-
signed to affect the milieu in which domestic and world politics
are conducted.
Rule-creating functions similarly involve the definition and
declaration of standards; however, the purpose is to frame
instruments that can have a legally binding effect. In the case of
IGOs, to have legally binding effect, such instruments usually
must be signed and ratified by some number of states, and the
instruments generally apply only to those states that have taken
such action. In a few IGOs, however, some decisions can be
taken that are legally binding without the necessity of implement-
13. INis L. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATION 34 (4th ed., 1984).
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ing action by member states. Several IGOs can adopt rules that
are binding for the constituent units.
Rule-supervisory functions involve measures taken to insure
compliance with the rules that are in force by those subject to
them. This function could entail steps, ranging from detection
of evidence that a violation has occurred, through verification
of that evidence, to the imposition of sanctions.
Operational functions involve the use of the resources at the
organization's disposal. Financial and technical assistance and
deployment of military forces are examples.
14
Given this range of functions, it is hardly surprising NGOs
often seem to possess an amorphous, indeterminate nature, a
situation with parallels in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth century. Public international unions were not segments of
governmental apparatus, drawing power from the circuits of a
pre-established dynamo of sovereignty, but rudimentary pieces
of a system of inter-governmental collaboration, dependent for
their operation upon such power as could be generated in the
new and drastically incomplete plant of international author-
ity.... These agencies engaged in a range of activities which
was something new under the international sun.... On the
whole, however, this was a system for the provision of services to
governments and the facilitation of cooperative relations among
governments, not for the management of affairs or the govern-
ment of people.
15
This Article focuses on NGOs to test their newly achieved promi-
nence in international law-making by examining their role in the
Landmines Convention and in the thwarting of the Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment. Are NGOs a manifestation of new governance
structures emerging in the information age? Can they be a check
against non-democratic, unaccountable, and aloof intergovernmental
institutions that may complicate, rather than solve, problems?16 So that
our discussion will be rooted in international law as usually understood,
we examine both international law's encounters with NGOs and how
NGOs relate to the sources of international law.
14. HAROLD V_ JACOBSON, NETWORKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND
THE GLOBAL POITICAL SYSTEM 83 (2d ed. 1984).
15. Id. at 35-36.
16. Some would say the way the IMF dealt with the Asian financial crises of 1998 falls into this
category.
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B. Defining NGOs
First, this Article defines NGOs and examines some of the assertions
made about them. There seems to be general agreement about a
working definition for NGOs along with substantial disquiet with that
definition. P.J. Simmons examined various definitions, including one
promulgated by the United Nations (UN), and concluded only "pri-
vate businesses, revolutionary or terrorist groups, and political parties"
are not NGOs.' 7 Professor H. K. Rechenberg's definition is typical:
Nongovernmental organizations are private organizations ...
not established by a government or by intergovernmental agree-
ment, which are capable of playing a role in international
affairs by virtue of their activities, and whose members enjoy
independent voting rights. The members of an NGO may be
individuals ... or bodies corporate.... There is some contro-
versy as to whether an NGO has to be international, permanent
and non-profit-making. Proper classification of NGOs is also
lacking. In terms of their activities there are, generally speak-
ing, two kinds of NGOs: those with non-profit, i.e., idealistic,
objectives, and those with economic aims.... The categoriza-
tion of an NGO may pose difficulties, as material and non-
material objectives sometimes exist side by side.1 8
Professor Jacobson describes "an early decision of the United Na-
tions [to] base the distinction [between NGOs and IGOs] on whether
or not the international organization was established by an agreement
among governments."1 9 The Economic and Social Council defined an
NGO as "[a] ny international organization which is not established by
inter-governmental agreement."' 20 The UN Charter, in many ways the
logical place to have addressed this issue, mentions NGOs but does not
define them. "The Economic and Social Council may make suitable
arrangements for consultation with nongovernmental organizations
which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrange-
ments may be made with international organizations and, where appro-
priate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member
17. P.J. Simmons, Learning to Live with NGOs, FOREIGN POL'Y, Fall 1998, at 82, 83.
18. Hermann H-K. Rechenberg, Non-Governmental Organizations, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAw 612, 612 (Rudolph Bernhardt et al., eds., 1997).
19. Jacobson, supra note 14, at4.
20. E.S.C. Res. 288B, U.N. ESCOR, 10th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 25 (1950).
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of the United Nations concerned., 21 Despite avoiding NGOs in its
constitutive document, the UN recognized, within months of its found-
ing, the value of NGOs in conveying information about the organiza-
tion and building bridges to the public.22 Professor Bruno Simma went
even further, asserting that NGOs are defined neither in the Charter
nor in general international law.
23
It is relatively clear what an IGO is, but NGOs have an "everything
else" character to them, prompting many to turn away from definition
towards classification. "NGOs includes everything from village associa-
tions in developing countries to large multi-faceted organizations
active around the globe. As a result, the definition provided here is an
effort to specify the range of actors which can be captured by the
dimensions offered in the following sections.", 24
One should be suspicious of a definition rooted in the absence of a
quality. "NGOs are named in terms of what they are not, rather than in
terms of what they are." 25 Is the term NGO so imprecise that it should
be done away with entirely? Kille, Peterson, and Smith suggested
changing the term to "civil society organizations."
[C]ivil society organization is preferable to NGO because it
provides a more accurate label of what these organizations
actually are and it is the term which is now being used by parts
of the UN System.... [C]ivil society refers to all of those
institutions and associations which exist between the individual
and the state. These structures allow groups in society to
represent themselves vis-d-vis other groups and the state. As
such they form cross-cutting networks which contribute to
pluralism and balance of power of the state.26
21. U.N. CHARTER art. 71.
22. See Farouk Mawlawi, New Conflicts, New Challenges: The Evolving Role for Non-Governmental
Actors, 46 J. INT'L Arr. 391, 393 (1993) ("The U.N. General Assembly quickly recognized the
importance of collaborating with NGOs and called upon the U.N. Department of Public
Information ... to work with NGOs interested in communicating information about the United
Nations.").
23. THE CHARTR OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 905 (Bruno Simma ed., Oxford
University Press) (1994).
24. Kent J. Kille et al., Sinking the Billiard Ball Model in the Corner Pocket: An Analytic
Typology of NGOs and the Implications for IR Research 6, Paper Prepared for Delivery at the
International Studies Association Annual Convention (April 16-20, 1996) (on file with Law and
Policy in International Business).
25. Id. at 9.
26. Id. at 10.
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Professors Leon Gordenker and Thomas Weiss took an interesting
and more analytical approach to NGOs. "IT]he prince represents
governmental power and the maintenance of public order; the mer-
chant symbolizes economic power and the production of goods and
services; and the citizen stands for people's power. As such, the growth
of NGOs arises from demands by citizens for accountability from the
prince and the merchant. ' 27 They concluded that, rather than getting
mired in legal distinctions, it is more productive to examine "goals,
relationships among various organisations and operating methods."
2 8
This leads them to suggest that NGOs be understood according to four
dimensions: organization, governance, strategy, and output. 29
Even those who make a convincing case for a new umbrella concept
to replace "NGO" realize current usage is probably too firmly en-
trenched to be easily dislodged because "it is hard to replace an idea
once it has become widely accepted." '30 This does not preclude many
sub-types of NGOs. Our approach is conventional-we shall use the
term NGO, but try to describe it more precisely in the models we
develop later.
C. Prospects for the NGO in the Information Age
Especially in the 1990s, NGOs seem to have taken an almost Hege-
lian leap in significance. A typical example of this expanded awareness
of NGOs can be seen in the views of former UN Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali:
Nongovernmental organizations are now considered full partici-
pants in international life.... Today, we are well aware that the
international community must address a human community
that is transnational in every way.... The movement of people,
information, capital, and ideas is as important today as the
control of territory was yesterday. . . . "[P]eace in the largest
sense cannot be accomplished by the United Nations system or
by Governments alone. Nongovernmental organizations, aca-
demic institutions, parliamentarians, business and professional
27. Leon Gordenker & Thomas G Weiss, Pluralising global governance: analytical approaches and
dimensions, 16 TmRD WoRLD Q. 357, 359 (1995). The analogy was developed from Marc Nerfin,
Neither Prince nor Merchant: Citizen-An Introduction to the Third System, 56 IFDA DossiER 3-29
(1986).
28. Gordenker, supra note 27, at 377.
29. See id. at 382.
30. Nerfin, supra note 27, at 9.
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communities, the media and the public at large must all be
involved."
3 1
Lester M. Salamon envisions a prominent role for NGOs within the
context of the globalization occurring in the late twentieth century.
"The upshot is a global third sector: a massive array of self-governing
private organizations.... The proliferation of these groups may be
permanently altering the relationship between states and citizens, with
an impact extending far beyond the material services they provide.
32
This expanded role for NGOs has produced a voluminous scholarly
literature most of which is very positive.33 Perhaps the apex of this
hyperpositive view is the belief that NGOs may democratize the UN by
creating a world assembly directly elected by the people.3 4 Does such a
positive view coupled with a loose definition militate against the
rigorous analysis necessary for understanding NGOs in their myriad
manifestations and roles? Typical of this juxtaposition of vagueness and
positive view is the approach of Farouk Mawlawi, who wrote, "The
significant proliferation of non-governmental organizations ... in re-
cent years, and their growing contributions to the improvement of the
human condition, have led to increased-and long overdue-recogni-
tion of the important role they can and do play in preventing and
resolving conflicts.
' 3 5
There is agreement that one of the major contributions of NGOs is
communicating information to governments, individuals, IGOs, and
other NGOs.3 6 Recently, information technology has transformed com-
31. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Foreword to NGOs, THE UN AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 7, 7-8
(Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker eds., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996) (quoting BOUTROS
BouI os-GHAL, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE (1995)).
32. Lester M. Salamon, The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 1994, at 109,
109.
33. See, e.g., Dianne Otto, Nongovernmental Organizations in the United Nations System: The
Emerging Role of International Civil Society, 18 HUM. RTs. Q. 107 (1996); Steve Charnovitz, Two
Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH.J. INT'L. L. 183 (1997); Peter
J. Spiro, New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision-Making
Institutions, 18 WASH. U. L.Q. 45 (1995).
34. See ERSKINE CHILDERS & BRIAN URQUHART, RENEWING THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM 174-81
(1994).
35. Mawlawi, supra note 22, at 392.
36. A concise description of the range of activities can be found in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ASSOCIATIONS, at vii (Tara E. Sheets & SarahJ. Peters eds., 1995). Among the activities they list are
"[e]ducating their members and the public; ... [i]nforming the public on key issues; ...
[dieveloping and disseminating information;... [e]stablishing forums for the exchange of
information and ideas;... [e]nsuring representation for private interests."
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munications so that it has become possible to mobilize worldwide
political networks almost overnight to address specific issues. The most
tangible manifestation of this transformation is the Internet. The
Internet, established in the 1970s by the U.S. military, originally was
designed to be "a computer network... that could withstand nuclear
attack.",3 7 The decentralized character of the Internet, essential for it to
continue operating after military conflagration, permitted it to meta-
morphose into the global system we know today.38 It can be difficult to
grasp the reach and complexity of the Internet because it is a constantly
expanding group of systems. It has been described as "an enormous
computer network in which any existing network can participate. It
encompasses satellites, cable, fiber and telephone lines, and it seems to
have grown exponentially.",39 Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates believes
the Internet is the most important development in computing since
the personal computer was introduced fifteen years ago.4°
In chronicling the development of NGOs, both Lester Salamon and
Peter Spiro have recognized the importance of technology. Salamon wrote,
The combined expansion of literacy and communications has
made it easier for people to organize and mobilize. Communi-
cations between capitals and hinterlands that once required
days now takes only minutes. Authoritarian regimes that had
successfully controlled their own communications networks have
grown powerless to stop the flow of information through satellite
dishes and faxes. Isolated activists can therefore more easily
strengthen their resolve, exchange experiences and maintain links
with sympathetic colleagues in their own countries and abroad.41
In a similar vein, Spiro noted the importance of technology to
support effective dissemination of information, including political
positions and advocacy by NGOs: "Modern communication is much
less dependent on location; increased travel, the fax, and perhaps the
most important the Internet have created the possibility of a cohesion
that is not tied to territory.
'
,
42
37. DEIBERT, supra note 2, at 131.
38. See id.
39. Robert E. Calem, The Network of All Networks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6,1992, at 12F.
40. See BILL GATES, THE RoAD AHEAD 91 (1995).
41. Salamon, supra note 32, at 117-18.
42. Peter J. Spiro, New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International
Decision-Making Institutions, 18 WASH. Q. 45, 47 (1995).
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New technologies such as the Internet have created enormous
opportunities for NGOs. Enterprising individuals with little institu-
tional infrastructure beyond a computer can mobilize thousands of
people over huge distances. The drawing power of computers is
enormous because it allows individuals who are similarly equipped (set
up with computers) tojoin a cause based on their own interests without
active solicitation. Technology permits NGOs to organize large num-
bers from multiple sectors, and to do so quickly, empowering NGOs in
the international political and international law-making arenas. Even
assuming good intentions, this new power will not necessarily have
positive results. It may become so cheap to start new NGOs that
competition for scarce resources will become more intense. NGOs can
coalesce around many different causes, good and evil.43
II. NEW GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES, NGOs, AND THE
INFORMATION AGE
A. The Evolving Perception of the Role of the NGO
Professor James Rosenau's description of the nature of change can
be applied to NGOs: "Change means the attrition of established
patterns, the lessening of order, and the faltering of governance, until
such time as new patterns can form and get embedded in the routines
of world politics."4 4 This creates the daunting challenge of discerning
what "new patterns" will emerge when change is occurring at many
levels and involves many centers of power, actors, and systemic assump-
tions.
In 1648, when the current state system emerged, decision-making
authority in international relations was given to autonomous states that
were expected to control activities within their borders and to function
as equals on the international plane. A secular, hierarchical model was
rejected-understandable in the context of the religious wars of that
period-leaving power in the hands of states. Three hundred and fifty
years later a new possibility has arisen, that governance which has "been
usurped by governments" needs to expand beyond those govern-
ments.
4 5
43. See Simmons, supra note 17, at 88. Simmons takes a very balanced view pointing out many
ways NGOs have done harm. Most are not deliberate, and most importantly, "the record for such
NGOs is surely no worse than that of governments." Id.
44. Rosenau, supra note 7, at 1.
45. Rajni Kothari, On Human Governance, 12 ALTERNATIVES 277, 277 (1987).
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The new routine of international relations that is emerging will see
an expanded and qualitatively different role for NGOs. Networks of
information providers are formed by individuals drawn together by a
shared interest. The importance of information to contemporary
governance means those with information will influence political and
legal processes. As Keohane and Nye noted,
Cheap flows of information have enormously expanded the
number and depth of transnational channels of contact. Non-
governmental actors have much greater opportunities to orga-
nize and propagate their views.... The future lies neither
exclusively with the state nor with transnational relations: geo-
graphically based states will continue to structure politics in the
information age, but they will rely less on material resources
and more on their ability to remain credible to a public with
increasingly diverse sources of information.
4 6
Rosenau's concept of governance that "embraces governmental
institutions, but.., also subsumes informal, non-governmental mecha-
nisms whereby those persons and organizations within its purview
move ahead, satisfy their needs, and fulfill their wants"'47 encapsulates
the new milieu within which international law will operate. How will
international law, which has centered on the state as the principal actor
as well as the locus of authority and power, respond in this new era?
Rosenau asks "whether the emergent, successor order rests on new
systemic foundations or whether it derives from the reconstitution of
the existing system. ,48 His answer is that it is too early to tell. "[M]uch
depends on how the key concepts are defined, thus enabling different
analysts to offer different interpretations as they accord greater or
lesser weight to the post-Cold War competence of states, the strength of
transnational issues, the power of sub-group dynamics, and the chang-
ing skills of citizens." 49
It would be inaccurate to imply that international law-primarily as
described by leading scholars-has ignored NGOs. Before World War
II, NGOs were thought to play only a secondary role. Even those
international law scholars who seemed most progressive and willing to
extend the reach of the law showed a certain hesitance about NGOs.
46. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 94.
47. Rosenau, supra note 7, at 4.
48. Id. at 22.
49. Id. at 23-24.
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Twenty years ago, Professor Louis Henkin wrote,
While international society today recognizes other entities-
intergovernmental and other international organizations (the
United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross),
national and multinational companies with major transnational
activities, even individual human beings-these are normally of
concern only when, and because, their actions and the effects
of their actions spill over national boundaries. Even to the
extent that the individual has become a "subject" of interna-
tional law, it is international law he is a subject of. Even the new
concern for the human rights of individuals finds expression to
date only through treaties and practices between nations, or
through organizations of nations or bodies created by na-
tions.50
In his more recent writings, Professor Henkin saw new possibilities
presented as information technology facilitated the extension of inter-
national law to the individual. "States can control physical penetration,
as by overflight in their airspace, but they cannot easily prevent
communication or exclude information, they cannot prevent inspec-
tion by satellite from outer space, and national frontiers can do little to
keep out or combat a growing number of environmental threats." 51
An early theme about NGOs-made even before the term NGO was
widely used-dealt with the formation of groups, often technical
experts, to assist policy makers. Professor Malcolm Shaw discussed the
nineteenth century origins of these groups:
The nineteenth century also witnessed a considerable growth
in international nongovernmental associations.... These pri-
vate international unions, as they have been called, demon-
strated a wide ranging community of interests on specific
topics, and an awareness that co-operation had to be interna-
tional to be effective. Such unions created the machinery for
regular meetings and many established permanent secretariats.
The work done by these organizations was, and remains, of
considerable value in influencing governmental activities and
stimulating world action.
52
50. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 15 (2d ed.1979).
51. Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 280 (1995).
52. MALcoLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 743 (3d ed. 1991).
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In describing the immediate post-World War I period, Professor
Ellery Stowell observed that states had expanded the scope of their
"voluntary co6peration through the establishment of international
unions and commissions, and have recently organized the League of
Nations and the World Court which give promise of better things to
come.
'' S
A recurring emphasis in scholarly writing about NGO activity has
been on groups of experts who provided an objective scientific basis to
guide the development of international law. Professor Quincy Wright at
the American Society of International Law's 1960 Annual Meeting
described the positive role of NGOs:
Private organizations have many advantages over official organi-
zations in the scientific exposition of international law....
Today the need for "an eye to the welfare of Society at large" is
greater than ever. Private institutions, whose members combine
legal wisdom with wisdom in the other social disciplines and
who view the problems of the world as a whole, can serve this
need.54
In this earlier era, the role of NGOs usually was seen as informa-
tional. This same 1960 American Society meeting included the observa-
tion that "international law is developing as the result of scientific
activities planned by non-governmental groups, not because of the
conscious concern of such groups with the development of interna-
tional law."
55
Contemporary international law is much less rigid and more inclu-
sive-NGOs have benefited from this disposition. This outlook found
early expression in the work and ideas of Professor (later World Court
53. ELLERY C. STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW XXX (1931).
54. Quincy Wright, Activities of the Institute of International Law, 54 AN1. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC.
194, 196-99 (1960). Wright commented that, as early as 1866, Dr. Francis Lieber wrote: "It would
be much better if a private Congress were established, whose work would stand as an authority by
its excellence, truthfulness,justice, and superiority in every respect." Id. at 197
55. John A. Johnson, Scientiflc Organizations and the Development of International Law, 54 AM.
Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 206, 211 (1960) (emphasis added). A number of the research and study
activities of the ASIL in the 1970s were meant to channel scientific information to the legal
community through its program on Science, Technology, and International Law. Studies which
came out of this project included ones on ocean dumping, the international telecommunications
union, global fisheries management, direct broadcasting from satellites, deep sea mining and the
environment, regulation of pesticide residues in food, regulation of pharmaceutical drugs, and a
global satellite observation system.
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Judge) Philip Jessup and is captured in the phrase "transnational
law."
The term "transnational law" [includes] all law which regulates
actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Both public
and private international law are included, as are other rules
which do not wholly fit into such standard categories....
Transnational situations, then, may involve individuals, corpora-
tions, states, organizations of states, or other groups.56
Today, international law scholars and practitioners have taken Jes-
sup's concept much further. A good example is the widely-used Weston,
Falk, and D'Amato text, which states: "More and more nongovernmen-
tal transnational actors.., are becoming primary actors in this human
rights sphere, manifesting their primary allegiance to world order
values with no territorial constraints." 57 The most recent version of this
text finds a qualitative change in NGOs reaching the point where they
"exert pressures, and [are] increasingly capable of ensuring construc-
tive results through direct action."
58
A good example of this broader view is presented by Judge Rosalyn
Higgins, who wrote: "[I] nternational law is not rules. It is a normative
system ... harnessed to the achievement of common values."' 59 She
rejects the traditional concept of "subjects" and "objects" of interna-
tional law as too narrow and prefers the phrase "international legal
participants," which includes individuals, corporations and NGOs.6 °
The law-making process in which all these participants are engaged is
open and competitive. "Everyone is entitled to participate in the
identification and articulation as to what they perceive the values to be
promoted. Many factors, including the responsive chords struck in
those to whom the argument is made, will determine whether particu-
lar suggestions prevail."
6 1
NGOs already engage actively in issue identification and value set-
ting, steps towards the "authoritative decision-making" that is defini-
tive of international law. However, NGOs have had difficulty finding a
seat at the table of authoritative decision-making. This is somewhat
56. PHILIP C.JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAw 2- 3 (1956).
57. Richard A. Falk, Contending Approaches to World Order, 31J. INT'L AFF. 171,192 (1977).
58. BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 1-2 (3d ed. 1997).
59. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 1
(1994).
60. Id. at 49-50.
61. Id. at 10.
[Vol. 31
CENTER STAGE FOR NGOS?
ironic because states long have relied on NGOs to provide the informa-
.tion that is essential to the entire process of decision-making. Their
influence on governments or organs of intergovernmental organiza-
tions have brought them closer to the source of authoritative decision-
making, but, important as this role has become, NGOs are not yet
authoritative decision-makers. A principal question for this analysis is
whether globalization and technology will elevate the status of NGOs.
B. The Expanding Role of NGOs in the Information Age
Contemporary circumstances have created opportunities for NGOs
to play more direct roles in international law-making. This stems in part
from international law's shift in focus from concerns of the state to
those of the individual. One theory attributes the shift to the fact that
little additional progress was being made in the state centric mode. As
Professor Henkin put it: "More states, diversity of states, have slowed
the movement from state values ('sovereignty') to human values, as in
the law of human rights or law for the environment. ' 62 These are areas
where states acting alone seemed not only incapable of solving prob-
lems, but seemed to have become part of the problem, e.g., in their
failure to protect the environment, weak economic and political devel-
opment, and abuses of human rights. This results in an expanded
"band of activism" within which NGOs operate. For example, the
second report from the International Law Association's Committee on
Cultural Heritage Law discussed "the role of NGOs ... both in defin-
ing the larger process of regulation and in implementing the harder
law forged by intergovernmental agreement and custom."
63
The technical character of many issues now facing policy-makers
continues to make them, as they have been for decades, if not centu-
ries, receptive to expert information. "New technology and the increas-
ingly complex and technical nature of issues of global concern not only
increase decision makers' uncertainty about their policy environment
but also contribute to the diffusion of power, information, and values
among states, thereby creating a hospitable environment for epistemic
communities." 64 Thus, NGOs starting in the 1990s may see their
62. Louis Henkin, Notes from the President, ASIL NEWSL. (Am. Soc'y Int'l L., Washington, D.C.),
Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 1, 2.
63. INTERNATIONAL LAw AssOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-EIGHTH CONFERENCE 219-20 (1998).
The report goes on to suggests six categories for NGOs: private dealers, auction houses and
collectors; museums and art galleries; anthropologists and archaeologists; indigenous and ethnic
groups; artists; and historic preservationists, archivists and art historians. See id. at 220.
64. Emanuel Adler & Peter M. Haas, Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order and the
Creation of a Reflective Research Program, 46 INT'L ORG. 367, 387 (1992).
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traditional nineteenth century-based role enhanced at the same time as
technology permits a new range of functions that can bypass state
borders.
Intergovernmental organizations have contributed to the promi-
nence of NGOs by circumventing governments. As governments seem
less able or willing to meet the financial needs of intergovernmental
organizations, IGOs have tapped the vast private wealth available
through the intermediation of NGOs. One result of this practice,
however, may be an exaggerated perception of the ability of NGOs to
carry out a wide range of activities. The potential fragmentation in
information, resources, and decision-making may, in the long run, be a
serious threat to the order and authority that are requisite to civil
society. The hesitancy of international law to accord full participatory
rights to NGOs in the law-making process stems in part from this
situation.
Structurally, international law remains constrained by a preoccupa-
tion with territorial states that conduct activities across borders. Change
is occurring, albeit slowly, to accommodate new actors and new voices.
Pressure from complex new issues and the intense involvement of
non-state actors like NGOs accelerate the change. NGOs do not
operate in a vacuum; they often gain stature by cooperating with states.
Although there are manifestations of new actors in areas previously
reserved to states, a new structure for law-making has yet to emerge.
Our work here is an assessment of how far the traditional law-making
structure has been stretched as NGOs operate in a new information
environment.
Most scholars acknowledge the positive influence NGOs have had on
contemporary international law in areas such as the well being of
individuals, human rights, gender and race equality, environmental
protection, sustainable development, indigenous rights, nonviolent
conflict resolution, participatory democracy, social diversity, and social
and economic justice.65 In the broadest sense, we may be moving
towards the point where effective and sustained attention to these
issues requires the political and financial mobilization of resources at
all levels from local to global. This is where the voluntary, local, and
issue specific character of NGOs make them a useful link between the
sub-national community and national and international communities
and institutions. By providing a link, NGOs supplement the human and
financial resources of governments and intergovernmental organiza-
65. See, e.g., Otto, supra note 33, at 140-41
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tions. Cynthia Price Cohen described these functions when she wrote,
The primary purpose of consultations with NGOs is to enable
governments to take advantage of the vast array of expertise
that can be provided by these groups. A secondary purpose is to
provide the necessary connection between the abstract delibera-
tions of governments and the practical needs and wishes of
their citizens.66
Successful NGOs combine enlightened policies with the ability to
mobilize constituents and the expertise to add to the competition
described by Judge Higgins. For international law, the contributions of
NGOs need to be tested against this need for authoritative decision-
making. "[A] crucial factor in the effectiveness of organizations is their
perceived legitimacy, [which] is linked to participation and transpar-
ency in their decision-making processes and to the representative
nature of bodies that exercise authority." 67 Although consideration of
these factors may help to develop a role for NGOs as authoritative
decision-makers, the diffuse and varied structure as well as the process
of international law-making makes an across-the-board law-making role
for NGOs difficult to formulate. Nevertheless, opportunities for NGO
involvement and their information collection capacities are likely to
increase as international law-making becomes a more continuous,
iterative process in moving towards a common objective rather than
merely establishing a specific, static norm.
NGOs have been extending their activities from issue identification
to the monitoring of state and IGO compliance with and implementa-
tion of international legal obligations. Professor Christine Chinkin
described this new role in terms of soft law: "The international legal
order is an evolving one that requires a wide range of modalities for
change and development, especially into new subject areas. They must
draw upon the entire continuum of mechanisms ranging from the
traditional international legal forms to the soft law instruments." 68
NGOs have achieved a measure of recognition at UN-sponsored
intergovernmental conferences through participation in preparatory
66. Cynthia Price Cohen, The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Drafting of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 12 HUM. RTs. Q. 137 (1990).
67. Spiro, supra note 42, at 53 (quoting a pamphlet from the Commission on Global
Governance)
68. C. M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38
INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 850, 866 (1989).
2000]
LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
activities and, to a degree, the conferences themselves. Participation
has varied with the recent addition of separate NGO fora that parallel
and complement the intergovernmental effort. The controversy over
the location and role of the NGO Forum at the Beijing Women's
Conference provided a pointed reminder of the ambiguity of the NGO
role in authoritative decision-making.
69
Traditionally, NGOs have helped to mold treaty language, although
usually working through national delegations. Increasingly, they are
also assisting with monitoring, compliance, and implementation of
those instruments. 70 NGOs can enter the picture at many points from
creating pressure-making demands-for norm change, to participat-
ing in treaty-drafting conferences. As treaties increasingly are seen not
as static statements of norms, but as organic entities constantly chang-
ing and meeting new contingencies, NGOs have a wider range of
opportunities to influence norms. This new situation is clear in the
myriad of roles for NGOs in the fifty-year history of the International
Whaling Commission.71
Proposals to allow NGOs some level of representation in the UN
General Assembly illustrate a new mode. UN organs like the General
Assembly aid in "the creation and shaping of contemporary interna-
tional law." 72 ProfessorJonathan Charney wrote,
Today, major developments in international law often get their
start or substantial support from proposals, reports, resolutions,
treaties or protocols debated in such forums. There, representa-
tives of states and other interest groups come together to
address important international problems of mutual concern.
Sometimes these efforts result in a consensus on solving the
problem and express it in normative terms of general applica-
tion. At other times, the potential new law is developed through
the medium of international relations or the practices of special-
ized international institutions and at later stages is addressed in
international forums. The process draws attention to the rule
and helps to shape it and crystallize it.
7 3
69. See generally Ann Marie Clark et al., The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison
of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women, 51
WORLD POL. 1, 20 (1998).
70. See Cohen, supra note 66, at 145.
71. SeeM.J. Peterson, Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management of
Whaling, 46 INT'L ORG. 147,147 (1992).
72. Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM.J. INT'L L. 529, 543 (1993).
73. Id. at 544.
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Professor Oscar Schachter has used a metaphor from architecture to
describe the law-making process. He envisions a three level structure.
On the ground floor, I place the action of states-including
the demands and goals of the governments and other orga-
nized groups in furtherance of their needs, wishes and expecta-
tions.
On the second level are the activities of a legal character-
the formation and invoking of legal norms, and their applica-
tion to particular situations.
On the third level, I would place the broad policy goals,
aspirations and ideals that influence governments and the
other actors.
Each of these levels exhibits its own values and processes. But
there is continuous movement from level to level. The sphere
of law in the middle level is influenced by the interests ex-
pressed below and the ideals and policy manifested above....
Legal norms have an impact on the perceptions of interest and
needs in the lower level and on the policies of the top level. This
image helps us to see that the UN Legal Order is influenced by
the multitude of political demands and interests from below (as
it were) and by the general ideals and principles on the higher
level. It also reminds us, that law exercises its influence in both
74directions, up and down. The stairways run both ways.
The place of NGOs within this building is a major issue for interna-
tional law. How many steps have NGOs taken up from the ground level?
Has NGOs' command of information, magnified by the technological
capacity to disseminate their message widely and to mobilize political
forces rapidly, started them up the stairway to Schachter's second level?
III. MODELS OF NGO INFLUENCE ON THE SOURCES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAw
This Section will use the sources of international law to assess the
influence exerted by NGOs. It examines three case studies of NGO
influence: (1) the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III), (2) the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stock-
piling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their
74. Oscar Schachter, The UN Legal Order: An Overview, in I UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 31,
(Oscar Schachter & C.Joyner eds., 1995).
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Destruction (the Ottawa Convention), and (3) the "false start" of the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in 1998. These three
cases demonstrate how technology has enhanced the political capacity
and power of NGOs and what might be expected in the future.
A. The Sources of International Law
The four sources of international law, recognized in the Statute of
the International Court of Justice and taught in every course in
international law, are:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
and
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59,judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.
7 5
Professor Oscar Schachter explained the centrality of sources:
The principal intellectual instrument in the last century for
providing objective standards of legal validation has been the
doctrine of sources. That doctrine which became dominant in
the nineteenth century and continues to prevail today lays
down verifiable conditions for ascertaining and validating legal
prescriptions. The conditions are the observable manifestations
of the "wills" of States as revealed in the processes by which they are
formed-namely, treaty and State practice accepted as law.76
Although there is a voluminous literature on the sources of interna-
tional law,77 we have found no diagrammatic representation of the
75. Statute of the International Court ofJustice, Article 38(1).
76. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRAcriCE 35 (1991).
77. See, e.g., ANTHONY A. D'AmATo, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1971);
Maarten Bos, Will and Order in the Nation-State System: Observations on Positivism and Positive
International Law, in THE STRucTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSO-
HY DOCrRINE AND THEORY 51 (R. St.J. Macdonald & Douglas M.Johnston eds., 1986) [hereinafter
STRUCTURE & PROCESS].
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sources, except for a few that do nothing more than list the four.78
Understanding possible interrelationship patterns among the sources,
along with the possible information flows and roles for NGOs is greatly
enhanced through the use of diagrams. The four main sources-treaty,
custom, general principles of law, and judicial decisions/teachings of
publicists-do not stand in isolation, as is often implied by a ranked list.
While the two pre-eminent sources, treaty and custom, certainly are the
clearest and most frequently used, often all four work as an interrelated
system to develop international law.
B. The Ability of NGOs to Influence the Sources of International Law
Figure I represents the most general case and illustrates interrelation-
ship patterns among states, IGOs, NGOs, and the four main sources of
international law. The most important question addressed in the
diagram is the directness of the link between NGOs and international
law. Is there any instance where NGOs directly influence a source that, in
turn, "creates" international law? The answer appears to be "yes," but
with debilitating qualifications. It is almost impossible to make a case
for a direct link between NGOs and the three most important sources,
treaty, custom, and general principles. Each of the three sources is cast
almost exclusively in terms of state action.
The definition of treaty provided in the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, "an international agreement concluded between
states in written form and governed by international law,"' 79 does not
seem to leave the door open for a direct NGO role. One could argue
that entities other than states are entitled to be parties to treaties, but
when that envelope has been expanded it almost never has included
NGOs.
Prospects for direct NGO participation through custom are hardly
more promising. Customary international law must meet two
requirements: habituality and a feeling of legal obligation (opinio
juris). A rule of customary international law comes into existence
when almost all states behave almost exactly the same way for a long
time and feel a legal obligation to do so. Judge Manley 0. Hudson
78. See, e.g., MAARTEN Bos, A METHODOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 16 (1984). Professor Bos
does not attempt to introduce the complexities into the diagram, but he describes them in the
narrative portions of his monograph. See id.
79. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2.1 (a), 1155 U.N.T.S 331,
333.
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FIGURE I
GENERAL CASE
provided this excellent description of the essential elements of
custom:
(a) concordant practice by a number of States with reference to
a type of situation falling within the domain of international
relations;
(b) continuation or repetition of the practice over a consider-
able period of time;
(c) conception that the practice is required by, or consistent
with, prevailing international law; and
(d) general acquiescence in the practice by other States.8°
It is clear that states, and states alone, dominate in the creation and
legitimization of customary international law. This does not mean that
NGOs have no influence, but that they must work through intermedi-
ate entities, principally states and IGOs.
A direct link between general principles and NGOs is equally difficult
to establish. Professor Georg Schwarzenberger listed general principles
80. M. 0. HUDSON, [1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/
Add.1.
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as the last "subsidiary" of three "law-creating processes,""' with the
following three requirements that must be met:
(1) Pit must be a general principle of law as distinct from a legal
rule of more limited functional scope;
(2) it must be recognized by civilised nations as distinct from
barbarous or savage communities;
(3) it must be shared by a fair number of civilised nations, and it
is arguable that these must include at least the principal legal
systems of the world.8 2
Perhaps a case could be made that NGOs help to clarify when a
principle has become general enough to fit within this definition, but
again NGOs, at most, help to apply icing to a cake prepared and baked
by states and IGOs.
Figure I shows a direct link between NGOs and the fourth source,
'judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists." In interpreting this link, one must remember this is a much
less significant source than the first three. Professor Schwarzenberger
went so far as to call it a "subsidiary law-determining agenc[y]," in
contrast to the first three which he characterized as "law-creating
agencies. ' '8 3 Within this already devalued category, there is an addi-
tional hierarchy with international courts first, municipal courts sec-
ond, and the writings of publicists bringing up the rear.84 It is possible
to conceive of groups of scholars and experts, working through NGOs,
having direct access to this fourth source.8 5 But opportunities for
NGOs to affect any of the sources directly remain marginal.
C. NGO Participation in Negotiating the
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
Figures II and III illustrate how this model of sources and NGOs
might be applied to a specific situation, the negotiation of the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea.8 6 UNCLOS III, stretching from
81. GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 28 (5th ed. 1967).
82. Id. at 33-34.
83. Id. at 35.
84. See THE LAW OF NATIONS: CASES, DOCUMENTS AND NOTES 48-50 (Herbert W. Briggs ed., 2d
ed. 1953).
85. SeeTHOMAS BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (1985).
86. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, UN Doc.A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in
21 I.L.M. 1261-1354 (1982).
2000]
LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
FIGURE 11
THE CASE OF THE 1982 UN CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
Ambassador Pardo's speech in 1967, through a decade-long confer-
ence, to the entry into force of the Convention in 1992, was the last
great pre-information age, law-making conference. Figure II shows the
elements of the model to highlight factors especially important to this
treaty-creating exercise. The NGO portion of the model (far left)
identifies six important clusters of NGOs8 7 active in the law of the sea.
In Figure II, the way NGOs exert influence is identical to Figure I,
i.e., through states and IGOs. However, there have been major changes
to other portions. Although four IGOs have been specified, the UN is
the preeminent IGO because it had administrative responsibility for
this huge conference. 8 Of course, virtually all specialized agencies of
the UN had some interest in the conference, but two, the Food and
Agriculture Organization and the International Maritime Organiza-
tion, had the most salient interests. The European Community was also
actively involved and is included in the diagram.
87. There are of course many others, but these represent some of the most important active
NGOs.
88. See Edward L. Miles, An Interpretation of the Negotiating of UNCLOS II, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF WANG TIEYA 551, 551 (Ronald St.J. Macdonald ed., 1994).
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FIGURE III
THE CASE OF THE 1982 UN CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
(Conference-induced additional opportunities for NGOs)
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The most significant change from Figure I to Figures II and III is the
insertion of the conference that created the 1982 Convention labeled
"UNCLOS III." This changed the dynamic completely. The sources of
international law-concretized for this example-had a direct impact
on the conference in the form of existing international law such as the
Truman Proclamation,8 9 the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continen-
tal Shelf,90 and the Icelandic Fisheries Case.91 The model illustrates
that these manifestations of existing international law permeated the
conference; after all, existing law has been made, followed, inter-
preted, and enforced by the very states negotiating the treaty.
Figure III differs from Figure II principally in that it indicates an
important, direct link between NGOs and UNCLOS III. On what basis
do we infer such a link? Multilateral conferences are strange phenom-
ena. Their goal is to negotiate treaties, they have "no regular sessions,
no permanent venue and no constitutional infrastructure. ' ' 92 In the
89. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
90. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
91. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175
92. M. C. W. Pinto, Modern Conference Techniques: Insights from Social Psychology and Anthropology,
in STRUCrURE & PROCESS, supra note 77, at 305, 308.
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case of UNCLOS III, the conference was so complex, so lengthy, and
had so many participants (at times more than 5,000 people), it devel-
oped its own character that was more hospitable to NGOs:
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea is
composed of delegates of some 160 participating states. These
are the principal actors in the negotiation, exercising full rights
as legislators, including the right to vote, and thus to influence
decisions on issues in a direct or immediate way. Observers have
a substantial, if mediate, impact as through the provision of
information.93
How was it that NGOs were able to gain access? First, the. size and
complexity of the conference gave NGOs many points of access to
those charged with deciding on the treaty. Access could come through
the UN or a specialized agency. Furthermore, NGO representatives
often were part of national delegations. Once access to conference
sessions was achieved, NGOs could exert influence on more than just
the entity (usually a government) that got them through the door. The
highly technical nature of the conference increased the potential role
for NGOs.94 For example, when trying to negotiate Part XI, the
provision for mining the deep sea-bed, the parties needed assistance in
understanding technical issues such as mining operations and geologi-
cal factors affecting the distribution of polimetallic nodules. This help
was available from NGOs representing the mining industries in North
America, Europe, and Japan. These interests were part of national
delegations and could form informal coalitions within the conference.
Two ironies should be acknowledged. First, if NGOs did play a more
significant, direct role, it was because sources, a major part of the
model, were moved to the periphery. NGOs were important in spite of
sources rather than operating through them. Second, UNCLOS III was
not an immediate success. It took more than a decade to negotiate,
needed another decade to garner the requisite sixty ratifications and
accessions to enter into force, and had to be renegotiated on the fly
(essentially suspending most of Part XI) to become widely acceptable
to key maritime states.95 It could be argued that the increased access
given to NGOs made negotiations less efficient and more protracted.
93. Id. at 310.
94. See Miles, supra note 88, at 552.
95. See Bernard, Oxman, The 1994 Agreement and the Convention, 88 AM. J. INT'L. L. 687, 688
(1994).
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We do not wish to skirt an important issue, to wit, how different is the
situation with UNCLOS III than that occurring constantly within the
UN system? A myriad of interests, including those of NGOs, are
represented every time the UN hosts a meeting or conference and, to a
lesser extent, during regular sessions of the General Assembly and its
committees. We believe that the combination of length and size of the
conference, the huge number of participants, and the highly technical
subject matter provided an increased opportunity for NGOs to have a
fairly direct influence on the formulation of a major treaty. Further,
political bargains struck early in the conference, e.g., the package deal
and consensus decision-making, helped to produce a lengthy, pro-
tracted conference with a concomitant increase in opportunity for
NGO influence.9 6
D. NGO Participation in Negotiating the Ottawa Convention
The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea generally was viewed
as involving a massive, highly technical set of issues that were difficult
for governmental leaders to interpret and almost impossible to explain
to the general public. One is hard pressed to think of a greater contrast
than the 1997 Ottawa Convention on Land Mines. Professors Ramesh
Thakur and William Maley described the process as '.'social networking
across national frontiers.",9 7 The way massive public support was mobi-
lized for this treaty is astounding given the slow pace usually character-
izing the treaty-making process. In fact, a panel discussion convened at
American University had the title "Is the Experience of the Landmines
Campaign Unique or is it a Model for International Law-making?",
98
The Ottawa Convention's final result seems superficially comparable
to UNCLOS III in that 120 states went to Ottawa in December 1997 to
sign the convention. But the process leading up to this event was much
different. As explained by Professor Kenneth Anderson in materials
96. See, e.g., Miles, supra note 88; Jonathan I. Charney, United States Interest in a Convention on
the Law of the Sea: The Case for Continued Efforts, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 39, 43 (1978); Barry
Buzan, Negotiatingby Consensus: Developments in Technique at the United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea, 75 Am.J. INT'L. L. 324, 328 (1981).
97. Ramesh Thakur & William Maley, The Ottawa Convention on Landmines: A Landmark
Humanitarian Treaty in Arms Control?, 5 GLOBAL Gov. 273, 283 (1999).
98. The panel was sponsored by the Washington College of Law of American University and
the American Society of International Law. It was held on February 27, 1998. One of the authors,
Ku, participated on the panel.
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prepared for the American University/American Society of Interna-
tional Law panel, the NGO presence was much more prominent:
The landmines campaign ... combined together from the
beginning several areas of international law and affairs that had
traditionally been thought of as conceptually very far apart ....
Several features of the NGO movement's strategy bear noting.
First, much of the campaign's early impetus came from strongly
organized national campaigns that pushed in the first place for
a unilateral governmental or legislative ban.99
Earlier efforts by NGOs to participate in a review conference encoun-
tered a traditional roadblock, i.e., "NGOs were excluded from full
participation... because conference members considered discussions
to be matters of disarmament and therefore national security." 100 The
saga of the Ottawa Convention depended on unprecedented coopera-
tion and mobilization of political forces that would not have been
possible before the information age. The international network that
was created served many functions, the most important of which was
linking activists around the world. Other complementary roles in-
cluded "spotlighting recalcitrants, whether they be governments or
private industries that produce (land)mines."10' A driving force was
Ms. Jody Williams, who brought order to an umbrella NGO confedera-
tion, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), "making
full and innovative use of the Internet, prodding coordination between
groups with agendas that often had no other common ground. °1 0 2 The
magnitude of NGO involvement is astounding; it has been estimated
that 225 NGOs actively lobbied the U.S. government.10 3 Success came
from Ms. Williams's effectiveness and commitment, on the one hand,
and new technologies on the other:
The other key factor was electronic mail, which enabled Ms.
Williams and other campaign workers to keep in regular con-
tact with their far-flung ground troops.
99. Kenneth Anderson, Memorandum to Attendees of Roundtable Discussion, A Thumbnail
Sketch of the Landmines Campaign 2 (Feb. 27, 1998) (on file with authors).
100. Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines, 52
INT'L. ORG. 613, 624 (1998).
101. Id. at 625.
102. Anderson, supra note 99, at 3.
103. SeeJim Wurst, Closing in on a Landmine Ban: The Ottawa Process and U.S. Interests, ARMS
CONTROLToDAYJune/July 1997, at 14, 17.
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Some observers say that such a global campaign involving
hundreds of grassroots groups would have been impossible as
recently as five years ago, when most organizations would have
lacked that technical capability.... [B]y using the Internet...
organizations could stay in close contact with one another and
with campaign organizers, whether based in Washington or in
rural Vermont, which is where Ms. Williams spent much of her
time. Electronic mail also enabled organizations to control
costs. 104
There was a flurry of activity in national capitals. The Canadian
federal government was a prime mover and is credited with convincing
states not to use the consensus approach so common in international treaty
making.10 5 Within Canada, the principal architect was Foreign Minister
Lloyd Axworthy,10 6 although in the early stages it can be assumed Axworthy
had at least the tacit support of Prime Minister Jean Chr6tian. Axworthy's
approach, which sought to remove landmine issues from the usual secrecy
of disarmament negotiations, has been termed "unconventional diplo-
macy."' 10 7 As momentum built and public opinion-both in Canada and in
most other countries-became very favorable, Chr~tian was handed a
dream issue for a Canadian prime minister. Canada legitimately could claim
to be a world leader, staking out a position clearly different from the
United States, but not a position likely to jeopardize the overall
bilateral relationship between Ottawa and Washington.
Figure IV is quite complex but still illustrates only a fraction of
activity that coalesced very quickly to build support for the treaty. The
model attempts to use the same general elements from the earlier
figures; however, the shoe is not a very good fit, which is probably
indicative of the uniqueness of the landmines issue and the effect of
new information technologies. NGOs are more prominent than in the
UNCLOS III example, having a more substantial and direct influence
on the treaty-making sequence. The group of conferences shown at the
bottom of the figure illustrates the mingling of NGO and IGO meetings
that characterized this process. Further, NGOs were far more impor-
104. Stephen G. Greene, A Campaign to Sweep Away Danger, CHRON. PHILANTHRoPY, Oct. 30,
1997, at 60.
105. Anderson, supra note 99, at 4.
106. SeeWurst, supra note 103, at 14.
107. Price, supra note 100, at 625.
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FIGURE IV
The Case of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction
(The Ottawa Convention)
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l st NGO Conference on Landmines (London, May 1993)
2nd NGO Landmine Conference, 75 organizations attend (Geneva, May 1994
3rd NGO Landmine Conference, 400 participants from 42 states (Cambodia, June 1995)
UN Conference to discuss global ban (Vienna, September, 1995)1
1
Conference attended by 76 governments, stipulates urgent need (Ottawa, October, 1996)
4th NGO Landmine Conference, 450 participants from 60 states (Mozambique. February, 1997)
Convention drafted by 100 states (Oslo, September, 1997)1
SOttawa Convention signed by 120 states (Ottawa, December 1997)1
tant at IGO meetings-NGO fora had a more prominent role than ever
and NGOs came much closer to getting seats at the negotiating table.
The state portion of the model (center) shows only a few examples
from a massive amount of activity. Although Canada's lead role is
acknowledged, Belgium was the first state to pass legislation compa-
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rable to the provisions that would later be included in the Conven-
tion.10 8 United States support was lukewarm. President Clinton tried to
reconcile Pentagon pressure with his desire to stay on the comfortable
side of public opinion. Senators Patrick Leahy and Chuck Hagel led an
effort in the U.S. Senate to "ban new deployments of antipersonnel
mines after January 2000. " 19 While full U.S. support was unlikely, at
least opposition was fragmented.
IGOs were active in myriad ways on many levels. One explanation for
NGO success is that human interest issues made issue cohesion easier.110
The contrast between the Ottawa Convention and UNCLOS III is clear.
In the latter case, the UN was the driving force. In the instance of the
Ottawa Convention support was more broadly manifest. The General
Assembly and the European Parliament passed resolutions endorsing
the treaty's provisions. In May 1997, the Organization of African Unity
pledged their twenty-five members to sign the Ottawa Convention."'
Austrian Chancellor (then Foreign Minister) Wolfgang Schussel de-
scribed the process in the following terms: "Lessons learned from the
Ottawa Process are that public opinion must be the driving force and
NGOs form with states one team. Their synchronous action will row the
boat. Together and amplified by the media we can do it."
112
E. The NGOs'Defeat of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment
A recent example of the influence of information on treaty-making is
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment. 1 3 This is a very compli-
cated, lengthy "treaty" in some ways reminiscent of UNCLOS III.
Professor Stephen Kobrin wrote an excellent, yet concise, summary of
the substantive terms of the "treaty:"
A broad definition of investment to include investment in
stocks and bonds, as well as foreign direct investment and
108. See id. at 625.
109. See id. at 625.
110. See Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human
Rights, 31 PS: POL. Sci. & POL. 517, 520 (1998).
111. See Greene, supra note 104, at 60.
112. Wolfgang Schussel, Editorial Report: Message from H.E. Mr Wolfgang Schussel, LANDMINFS
(Apr. 1998) <http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/NewsLetter/3_1/austria.htm>.
113. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI Negotiating Text) (April 24, 1998)
<http://www.oecd.org//daf/investment/fdi/mai/maitext.pdf>.
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contract rights, intellectual property, real estate, and "claims to
money.
- Very strict limits on "performance requirements"-laws gov-
erning such matters as the obligation to have a certain level of
local content... and domestic equity participation....
- Limits on expropriation subject to the "usual" justifications
and conditions: a public purpose; nondiscriminatory applica-
tion; due process; and prompt, adequate and effective compen-
sation. The phrasing, however, is quite broad, including ...
"measures having equivalent effect."
- Free transfer or repatriation of capital, profits, interest pay-
ments, expropriation settlements, and the like.
- Dispute settlement provisions that establish an international
tribunal to arbitrate between countries and give private inves-
tors standing to sue a country in its courts for breach of the
agreement or to bring action in an international tribunal.
- Provisions that require countries to "roll back" existing laws
or regulations that are not in accordance with the MAI and
refrain from passing new laws that contradict it.
- Specific application of nondiscrimination or national treat-
ment to privatization, monopoly regulation, and access to min-
erals and raw materials.'
1 4
Jumping ahead to the climax (or, more accurately, the anticlimax),
in April 1998, after three years of negotiations, the MAI was stopped
dead in its tracks. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), under whose auspices the MAI was negotiated,
tried to put a positive face on developments by asking for a six-month
delay.115 OECD Secretary-General Donald Johnston, finally realizing
that his organization had been outmaneuvered, remarked, "It's clear
we needed a strategy on information, communication, and explica-
tion." 116 Some held out hope the negotiation would be revived.
However, on December 3, 1998, the OECD announced that after " [a]n
informal consultation among senior officials .... [n] egotiations on the
114. StephenJ. Kobrin, The MAI and the Clash of Globalizations, FOREIGN POL'Y, Fall 1998, at 97,
101.
115. Seeid. at98.
116. Madelaine Drohan, How the Net Killed the MAI: Grassroots Groups Used Their Own
Globalization to Derail Deal GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 29, 1998, at Al (quoting Johnston's
statement at a press conference).
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MAI are no longer taking place." '17 This experience represents one of
the fastest, most resounding defeats for a treaty-a defeat attributable
to the efforts of NGOs. The history of the MAI under the OECD was
only about three years.
The life of the MAI can be benchmarked between the Halifax
G7 Summit of 1995 and the Birmingham G7 Summit of 1998.
At Halifax, in June 1995, the final communique endorsed the
negotiation of a set of multilateral rules for investment (the
MAI) at the Paris-based [OECD]. Almost concurrently, minis-
ters and delegates at the OECD launched technical and substan-
tive discussions, hoping to conclude the MAI within two years,
in April 1997. Failure to conclude the agenda at that date led to
a one year extension, but by April 1998, it was clear that final
agreement on the MAI was still far off."
18
The desirability of negotiating the MAI under OECD auspices was
controversial. The OECD, based in Paris, represents twenty-nine major
economic powers: all of Western Europe plusJapan, the United States,
Canada, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Reasons for using the
OECD include the fact that its membership accounts for about ninety
percent of the world's direct foreign investment.' 19 Further, the OECD
has broad experience in drafting investment treaties. 120 However, many
developing countries are suspicious of the OECD, believing it to be a
club of rich countries that would give priority to the interests of
multinational enterprises headquartered in member countries. 12 Even-
tually, the negotiations may be taken over by the WTO, but consensus
seems to be that with its membership of 132-five times that of
OECD-it would be even harder to reach agreement.
It is understandable how many "outsiders" might view this process as
117. Press Release by Organisation for Economic Co-opertation and Development, Informal
Consultations on International Investment, 11 1,3 (Dec. 3, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/
newsand events/release/nw98-114a.htm.>.
118. Alan M. Rugman, The Political Economy of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 4 (last
modified Aug. 23, 1999) <http://www.library.utoronto.ca/g7/annual/rugmanl998/index.html>.
119. See id. 5.
120. Seeid.
121. See Global Policy Forum, OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Fact Sheet, Friends of
theEarth-US (Feb. 19, 1997) <http:www.igc.org/globalpolicy/socecon/bwi-wto/oecd-mai.htm>.
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secretive and unresponsive to. the needs of developing countries.
2 2
OECD carried on the negotiations largely oblivious to mounting
opposition. A notable example occurred in October 1997. The negotia-
tions were nearly completed when OECD Secretary-General Donald
Johnston presided over an "informal" consultation with NGOs. 12 3 Mr.
Johnston's remarks clearly show that he believed matters were moving
along well. He began by enumerating NGO concerns, including na-
tional sovereignty, treatment of foreign personnel, labor practices, and
accommodating the interests of countries not participating in the
negotiations. 124 Although not totally oblivious to opposition, Johnston
grossly underestimated that opposition. He commented that the "OECD
has always taken a balanced approach to foreign direct investment.,
125
At the end of his remarks, Johnston announced that "a broad frame-
work is now in place" and that he was ready to review the MAI with
NGO representatives in attendance. 26 Poor communications, a pro-
cess perceived to be secretive, and thisfait accompli attitude set the stage
for opposition to rise up and overwhelm the MAI.
1 2 7
Lawrence Herman, apparently unaware of the Ottawa Convention,
wrote: The MAI was the first real Internet negotiation. Never before
was so much information on an international negotiation available
from so many different sources to so many different people. Interest
groups and average citizens came armed with massive amounts of
cyberspace information about the MAI.
128
In this instance, a coalition of groups used the Internet to stop the
treaty cold. Hundreds of advocacy groups, attempting to galvanize
opposition to the MAI, used terms and examples that brought their
message home to the public. Their sites on the World Wide Web were
colorful and easy to use, offering primers on the MAI that anyone
could understand.129 The range of NGOs working against the MAI and
the variety and hyperbole of their claims are amazing. The following
122. See Madeline Drohan, MAI Talks Shunted as Trade Ministers Assess Options, GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto), Apr. 29, 1998, at B6.
123. See DonaldJ. Johnston, Opening Remarks at the Informal Consultation with NGOs on
the MAI (Oct. 27, 1997) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/sgngo.htm>.
124. See id. 3.
125. Id. 16.
126. Id. 19.
127. See Drohan, supra note 122.
128. Lawrence Herman, Internet Flexed Muscles in MAI Negotiations, FIN. POST, Apr. 30, 1998,
at 21.
129. See id.
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examples provided by Professor Kobrin are illustrative:
"The MAI... will serve as a Charter of Rights and Freedoms for
transnational corporations against citizens and the earth, and
represents a grave threat to democracy in Canada."
-[Canadian activists] Maude Barlow and Tony Clarke
"[The MAI is] one of the gravest threats ever to the economic
development and national sovereignty of countries of the
South."
-Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, director, Just World Trust
"If the OECD gets its way, the British government will never
again be permitted to restrain the rapacity of the private
sector."
-Environmental advocate George Monbiot, letter to the Lon-
don Guardian, April 15, 1997
"Under [the] MAI, local, regional and federal governments
could no longer make low-interest loans to local businesses, cut
taxes for businesses that hire members of local communities, or
give minority-owned or environmentally conscious companies
preference in the awarding of public-works contracts."
-Gabriel Roth, San Francisco Bay Guardian, October 15, 1997130
The unprecedented influence of a large group of disparate NGOs
was due to more than flashy, state-of-the art web sites. Some estimates
place the number of opposition NGOs at more than 600.131 Professor
Rugman argued convincingly that the United States' failure to pass
trade legislation and to give President Clinton fast-track negotiating
authority created a "vacuum the NGOs were able to step [into] and
steal the agenda." 132
The case of the MAI may presage a new era where justification to a
wider audience-certainly a democratic principle-will be an essential
part of treaty making. But it would be simplistic and premature to
proclaim global grassroots democracy. Are some issues too complex to
explain to a mass audience? Canada spawned one of the most active
anti-MAI NGO efforts lead by Maude Barlow, head of the Council of
Canadians, a major global influence against the MAI. But Ms. Barlow
did not have broad popular support in Canada. In 1993, she cam-
130. Kobrin, supra note 114, at 103.
131. See id. at 97.
132. Rugman, supra note 118,1 15.
2000]
LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
paigned actively for a number of candidates in the federal election-
those whom she supported receiving less than one percent of the votes
cast. 133 The situation in Canada confirms the observation of reporter
Reginald Dale: "NGOs often display none of the transparency they
seek in others, hide the sources of their funding and represent only
narrow special interests, not the wider public.' 134 The negotiating
process for treaties often needs a degree of secrecy to facilitate delicate
political bargains. Will Internet diplomacy make this impossible?
We believe these three examples-the MAI, the Ottawa Convention,
and UNCLOS III-illustrate important aspects of contemporary NGO
influence. It may be premature to generalize from only three cases, but
the reasons for NGO influence are telling. In the case of the Law of the
Sea Convention, the duration of the conference, the complexity of the
issues, including the need for technical expertise, created a rare
opportunity for NGO influence because states needed information
often available only from NGOs. In the case of the Ottawa Convention,
the issue was concrete, the human dimension palpable, and states had
an existing legal and institutional platform on which to place the issue
as soon as popular momentum began to build-the speed and scope of
mobilizing political support through technology was evident. Finally, in
the case of the MAI, political opposition came from a host of issues
ranging from human rights to environmental protection. Again, tech-
nology permitted fast and broad mobilization of an unprecedented
nature.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR A SHIFT IN GOVERNANCE
We have argued that an expanded place for NGOs is inevitable and
can be constructive-even decisive-in the development of interna-
tional law. Prosaic as it may seem, an enormous amount of analytical
work on NGOs remains to be done. Our review of existing analyses and
concepts of international law-making suggests areas particularly ripe
for study. For example, Professor Dinah Shelton sees an important
function for NGOs before courts, providing another access point to
international law:
Nongovernmental organizations are playing an increasingly
important role in international litigation.... International pub-
133. See id. 11.
134. Reginald Dale, The NGO Specter Stalks Trade Talks, INT'L HERasi TM., Mar. 5, 1999, at 11.
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lic interest organizations... may institute cases or intervene as
parties, serve as court- or party-appointed experts for fact
finding or legal analysis, testify as witnesses, or participate in
proceedings as amici curiae. . .. The role of amicus ... is
generally less costly and time-consuming than mounting a full
case. 
135
A critical look at the accepted definition of NGOs suggests some
radical possibilities. For example, important institutions usually as-
sumed to fall into the IGO category might arguably be NGOs. Gorden-
ker and Weiss speculate about quasi-governmental organizations and
donor-organized nongovernmental organizations. 1 6 What about the
International Court of Justice, the most important court of interna-
tional law? The virtually unchallenged assumption is that the ICJ is an
IGO, part of the global IGO, the UN. But can an IGO create an NGO?
Because the ICJ "shall be the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations" 13 7 and "[a]ll Members of the United Nations are ipsofacto
parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice,', 138 is it
inconceivable that the ICJ could be an NGO? States do not belong to
the ICJ in the way they belong to the FAO. Further, the dictates of
judicial impartiality forced the ICJ to distance itself from states, adding
to this impression of quasi-NGO status. 1 3 9 The point, of course, is not to
argue literally that the ICJ is an NGO. However, a functional approach
emphasizing what NGOs do, not just how they are created, shows how
porous the traditional categories have become.
Recent efforts creating international tribunals and courts to enforce
international standards and norms in areas where national judicial
institutions are found to be inadequate, e.g., the International Crimi-
nal Court and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, suggest that a new era is dawning. This new era
is characterized by expanded roles for NGOs contemporaneous with
international law focusing more on human rights. The notion-
virtually unassailable a century ago-that the state is the only subject of
135. Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial
Proceedings, 88 AM.J. INT'L L. 611, 611 (1994).
136. Gordenker, supra note 27.
137. U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
138. U.N. CiAmTER art. 93, para. 1.
139. See, e.g., ICJ Statute, Art. 2 (requiring that the court be composed of independent
judges); ICJ Statute, art. 18(1) (requiring unanimous opinion of other judges for dismissal from
the court).
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international law is giving way. NGOs have contributed to this systemic
shift.
This Article began with a focus on technology's effect on NGOs,
particularly as their work related to the development of international
law. The sources of international law helped to demonstrate the
workings of the law-making process. The complexity of an issue, as is
the case with the ten-year negotiation of UNCLOS III, with its 320
articles and 9 annexes, plus the number of negotiating parties (160 in
this instance), created a political dynamic more open to influence by
private parties including NGOs. This influence was wielded through
government representatives, officials of sponsoring organizations, and
conference secretariats. NGOs served as sources of information, chan-
nels of communication, and purveyors of solutions for the negotiation
of stalemates or logjams. The Ottawa Convention illustrates the "accel-
eration of history" made possible when NGOs use information-age
technologies in an international system freed from the constraints of
Cold War bipolarity and where states' interests have not fully ripened in
a particular issue area.
Technology appears to have made a qualitative difference for NGOs
in two primary ways. First, it enhanced their power as information
purveyors in a complex and information-rich environment. Second,
technology has greatly expanded the ability of NGOs to mobilize and to
organize a critical mass of support so that they cannot be ignored the
way they were in the MAI negotiations.
The nature and frequency of contacts and interactions across bor-
ders have increased drastically, requiring both more complicated as
well as more open-ended international legal obligations and frame-
works to support them. This more intense process of making and
developing law has moved international law away from a rule orienta-
tion towards one that considers values, frameworks, and processes. In
this context, private actors-corporations, individuals, and NGOs-
have an opportunity to help determine which questions should engage
the attention of governments.
Whether NGOs will contribute to better global governance and
more civil society depends on how they are used and how they relate to
the interests and functions of national and international institutions.
Recent scholarship and practice demonstrate that NGOs are an impor-
tant factor for a full understanding of contemporary international
legal and political processes and have the potential to advance human
rights and develop international law in myriad ways. The instantaneous
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global reach of the information age provides the means to do so.
Professors Thakur and Maley have optimistically stated that, "NGOs
have for many years acted as systemic modifiers of state behavior. The
case of the Ottawa Convention shows that the role of NGOs has
changed from constraining state behavior to setting and driving the
international agenda." 
140
We began this inquiry by speculating about whether information-age
forces that affect individuals will necessarily influence international
law. It seems appropriate to conclude by trying to fit international law
into the new social fabric being woven by the information age. Cana-
dian academic DavidJohnston has written eloquently about a "triangle
of success" consisting of "wealth creation, social cohesiveness and
political liberty."' 41 In 1500, Islam and China both led Western Europe
in technology, but since then Western Europe has moved far ahead as a
result of a better balance among these three elements. 142 Professor
Johnston described the present situation in this way: "Today, we are
faced with a parallel challenge: can we use the new tools of information
technology to enhance and strengthen the synergy across the three
corners of the same triangle?"
' 143
The heightened role of NGOs is pertinent to Johnston's con-
ceptualization. NGOs have helped to bolster each side of the
triangle. The Ottawa Convention certainly is an attempt to advance
human liberty. Some might argue that the MAI was a noble effort at
global wealth creation, an attempt thwarted by NGOs. The social
cohesiveness side of the triangle can be even more problematic. The
information age permits seamless, instant communication across bor-
ders, which certainly has the potential to undermine social cohesion.
The answer to this apparent contradiction lies in realizing that, while
each side of the triangle represents a positive value, advancing any one
of the three may come at the expense of the others. This is precisely
what law is all about, balancing social values when they conflict with
one another.
For more than 350 years, states have been the principal actors
applying law to adjust among competing values. NGOs are now emerg-
ing as an additional force in the application of law to adjust among
these values. The values themselves can be as varied as prohibiting the
140. Thakur & Maley, supra note 97, at 297.
141. Johnston, supra note 4, at 59-60.
142. See id. at 59
143. Id. at 60.
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shouting of "fire" in a crowded theater and outlawing torture previ-
ously hidden behind the veil of territorial sovereignty. NGOs have
heightened status and efficacy as part of international law's effort to
balance and advance human values. We live in interesting-cyberspa-
cial-times.
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